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tain their amount.1 6 The contract in the principal case is like these, both
in the matter of certainty and consideration. Consideration for the promise
of permanent employment may be found in the teacher's promise to give up
the privilege of teaching elsewhere during the required probationary period.
Minimum salaries are fixed by statute for the payment of teachers.17
Thus it appears that in any action at law for the breach of a teacher's tenure
contract, the teacher should be entitled to damages based on the minimum
salary established by law, or on the reasonable salary to which he was
entitled, if he can prove that the reasonable salary would have been higher
than the minimum established by law. C. D. S.
DAMAGES-BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THIRD PARTIES IN MrriGATIoN.-Action
for personal injuries. Plaintiff appealed from the lower court's refusal to
instruct the jury that the fair value of the nursing care rendered plaintiff by
his wife was a proper element of damages. Held, affirmed. Daniels v. Celeste
(Mass. 1939), 21 N. E. (2d) 1.
It was reasoned that the fair value of nursing care is recoverable only if
the plaintiff has paid or incurred a legal liability to pay.1 The court pointed
out that, by reason of the marital relation, the plaintiff could not make a
valid contract with his wife for such services. 2 Therefore, thg plaintiff may
not recover for services for which he is under no obligation to pay.
The case adopts a minority rule that benefits received from sources wholly
independent of the wrongdoer may operate to reduce damages recoverable from
the latter.3 The court pointed out that the object of compensatory damages
is to afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong
of another. 4 The conflict in cases has arisen in determining whether actual
loss has occurred. The principal case holds that no loss is suffered where the
plaintiff is under no obligation to pay for the services rendered. The issue
was early raised in cases involving a wrongdoer claiming benefit of insur-
16 Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan (1892), 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802; Carnig
v. Carr (1897), 167 Mass. 544, 46 N. E. 117; Fisher v. John L Roper Lumber
Co. (1922), 183 N. C. 485, 111 S. E. 857; F. S. Royster Guano Co v. Hall
(1934), 68 Fed. (2d) 533.
17 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), § 28-4314.
1 Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co. (1912), 212 Mass. 99, 98 N. E. 786.
2 Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed.), c. 209, sec. 2: "A married woman may make
contracts, oral and written, sealed and unsealed, in the same manner as if
she were sole, except that she shall not be authorized hereby to make contracts
with her husband." This statute, although noted by the court, does not
change the common law since there can be no valid contract between husband
and wife for the performance of duties incident to the marriage relation.
Bohanan v. Maxwell (1921), 190 Iowa 1308, 181 N. W. 683.
3 McCormick on Damages (1935), sec. 90.
4 " 'Rule of damages is a practical instrumentality for the administration of
justice. The principle on which it is founded is compensation. Its object is
to afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong of
another. Recurrence to this fundamental conception tests the soundness of
claims for the inclusion of new elements of damage.' Sullivan v. Old Colony
St. R. (1908), 197 Mass. 512, 83 N. W. 1091."
RECENT CASE NOTES
ance. The courts have unanimously refused this claim.5  Decisions on other
claims have not been so clear.6
The cases can be analyzed according to the relation between the plaintiff
and the party bestowing the benefit by which the wrongdoer attempts to reduce
his damages. This relationship may be one of contract, liability barred, gift,
or duty.
The first two classifications are usually settled by denying such benefits to
the wrongdoer. Benefits may be conferred in performance of contracts in
the insurance situation and in the employer's continuance of an injured plain-
tiff's wages. 7 The result appears to be founded on the ground that the
wrongdoer should not share in the benefits of a contract for which the plain-
tiff has paid all the consideration. 8 Where plaintiff's liability to a third party
is barred, such as a discharge in bankruptcy, the courts have uniformly
permitted recovery in damages from the wrongdoer on the theory that he
must be given a chance to pay an honest debt.9
When a third party bestows a gift upon an injured plaintiff,' 0 he intends
such to be for the benefit of the particular donee, and not for the benefit of
5 Roth v. Chatlos (1922), 97 Conn. 282, 116 A. 332 (Hospital expense
allowed though covered by insurance) ; Sherlock v. Ailing (1873), 44 Ind. 184(Life insurance); Regan v. N. Y. R. (1890), 66 Conn. 124, 22 A. 503; and
Cunningham v. Evansville & T. H. R. (1885), 102 Ind. 478, 1 N. E. 800 (Prop-
erty insurance). See also: 18 A. L. R. 678 and 95 A. L R. 575.
6 The problem is similarly presented in cases involving recovery of dam-
ages for loss of time where the employer has continued the injured plaintiff's
wages during his disability The Massachusetts court concluded the issue in
such cases by declaring the plaintiff's cause of action was not for loss of
wages but for something apart, the impairment of the capacity to earn.
Doherty v Ruiz (Mass. 1939), 18 N. E. (2d) 542. The New York courts met
the issue and refused recovery of damages where plaintiff's wages continued
during disability, and held expressly to the idea that the plaintiff is entitled
only to his pecuniary loss. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore (1880), 80 N. Y. 390,
36 Am. Rep. 624. One jurisdiction makes a distinction between wages con-
tinued according to a previous contract and wages continued as a mere
gratuity of the employer, allowing recovery in the latter situation only. Pensak
v. Peerless Oil Co. (1933), 311 Pa. 207, 166 A. 792. The majority view of the
problem in this situation is represented by the leading case, Ohio and M. R.
Co. v. Dickinson (1877), 59 Ind. 317, holding that damages are assessed
according to uniform principles and are not to be affected by the mere acci-
dental business relations of the party injured. For a review of the cases, see
18 A. L. R. 678 and 95 A. L. R. 575.
7 See footnotes 5 and 6, supra.
8 1 Sedgwick on Damages (9th ed. 1909), sec. 67.
9 Mueller v. Kuhn (1895), 59 IIl. A. 353 (Plaintiff's liability for medical
expense barred by running of statute of limitations.) Even in Massachusetts,
where plaintiff's liability for medical expense was barred by bankruptcy,
recovery was allowed. The court said this was a "debt of honor." Sibley
v. Nason (1907), 196 Mass. 125, 81 N. E. 887, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173.
10 The gift relation has occurred under various circumstances: 1. Gift of
services by a friend or physician. Here, again, the majority favors recovery.
Brosnan v. Sweetser (1891), 127 Ind. 1, 26 N. E. 555; Varnham v. Council
Bluffs (1879), 52 Iowa 698, 3 N. XV. 792; contra: Goodhart v. Penn. R. (1896),
177 Pa. St. 1, 35 A. 191, 55 A. S. R. 705. 2. Professional custom of doctors
not to charge each other for services. Indianapolis v. Gaston (1877), 58 Ind.
224 (Recovery allowed) ; contra: Rigby v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (La. A.
1933), 151 So. 119. 3. Indigent receiving care from county. In Englewood v.
Bryant (1937), 100 Colo. 552, 68 P. (2d) 913 recovery was refused. It is
submitted this is contra to the majority rule. 4. Charitable purse. Citizens
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the wrongdoer."1 The situation which has caused the most confusion is the
one involving a duty relation. The question is whether the wrongdoer should
be compelled to compensate for services which belong to the plaintiff as a
matter of right.
The court in the principal case based its decision in part upon cases
permitting a married woman to recover only where her separate estate is
liable for services rendered to her as a result of a tortious injury. These
cases are not authority for the decision of the principal case that the husband
may recover for services rendered to him only where he has incurred liability.
Such cases merely show that in the legislating away of the wife's common law
incapacity to sue, there remains a presumption that the husband is primarily
legally responsible for her support and care and that she can recover ex-
penses incurred in fulfilling this duty only where her separate estate is
liable.12 It is significant that states which do allow the husband to re-
cover for services for which he is under no obligation to pay, at the same
time, accept the principle cited by the Massachusetts court that a married
woman may recover for services rendered her only where her separate estate
is obligated.13
The fundamental issue becomes one of application of the principles upon
which the rule of damages is founded. A few courts surmount the difficulty
by technical reasoning and hold that where the plaintiff, husband, is cared for
by the wife, he loses the value of her ordinary services as a housewife and
may recover for this loss.1 4 One court permitted recovery on the ground
that the wife had conferred an "extra service" for which the wrongdoer
must compensate the plaintiff.15  Another court allowed recovery on the
ground that services between members of the family are not often paid for
in cash, there being a tacit understanding or moral obligation that the
recipient will reciprocate in kind.16
The difficulties of such complex legal reasoning could be resolved by the
adoption of the generalized standard of the value of the necessary services
rather than the theory of reimbursement for the specific outlay.17 It is sug-
gested that as a matter of policy, damages should not be reduced at the
expense of circumstantial relation between the injured plaintiff and a benevo-
lent third party. W. S. H.
Gas & Oil Mining Co. v. Whipple (1904), 32 Ind. A. 203, 69 N. E. 577.
(Fellow citizens recompensed plaintiff for property loss, which was held to
be immaterial as affecting the amount of damages recoverable from the
wrongdoer.)
II 1 Sedgwick on Damages (9th ed. 1909), sec. 67.
12 Cassidy v. Constantine (1929), 269 Mass. 56, 168 N. E. 169.
13 Shelby County v. Castetter (1893), 7 Ind. A. 309, 34 N. E. 687.
14 Houston & E. C. R. Co. v. Gerald (Tex. Civ. A. 1910), 128 S. W. 166.
This position is made stronger in the principal case by the fact that the
plaintiff's wife was a registered nurse and utilized her professional ability
in his care.
15 Missouri R. v. Holman (1896), 15 Tex. Civ. A. 16, 39 S. W. 130.
16 Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball Assn. (1913), 122 Minn. 327, 142 N. W.
706, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 922.
17 McCormick on Damages (1935), sec. 90, p. 323.
